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ABSTRACT. The main purpose of this paper is to critically analyse and assess 
the functions of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the context of 
the expressed expected outcomes versus actual outcomes. The CDM as a 
market mechanism is argued to function to perfection, but seems to fail in terms 
of delivering the expected development benefits. This paper attempts to 
delineate why the CDM undermines its sustainable development component of 
its dual objective and, to some extent, why it was too optimistic to assume in 
the first place that the CDM per se would deliver sustainable development. This 
is primarily done through an empirical framework by explaining the functions 
of the CDM, how it is structured, and illustrating the criticism of the CDM with 
some theoretical considerations deployed. Ultimately, the paper argues that 
there is a serious built-in flaw with the CDM, which at present is not addressed. 
Introduction 
The CDM is one of the three flexibility mechanisms1 established under the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997 in which projects under the CDM label enable countries committed 
to the protocol to earn saleable certified emission reduction credits (CER) (Kyoto 
Protocol: Article 12). The credits are generated from activities, which boost the 
environment’s capacity to absorb carbon, and through investment in sustainable 
development projects that reduce emissions in a developing country itself or by a 
developed country active in a developing country. These credits can be traded, sold or 
used by industrialised countries to meet their targets under the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNFCCC 2011). Any CDM project or activity must be regarded as achieving 
sustainable development in developing countries, as well as reducing greenhouse gas 
emission by the CDM Executive Board2 and the host country in which the CDM 
project is located in order to achieve the ultimate objective of the Kyoto Protocol 
itself (Kyoto Protocol: Article 12). 
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However, the CDM’s abilities to successfully fulfil its dual objective has been 
questioned many times since its implementation, especially by a number of 
international radical environmental and development organisations, and larger 
internationally acknowledged organisations that have, either directly or indirectly, 
accused or criticised the CDM for contributing to the inequalities in the South (Blok 
2010: 18-22). The criticism of the CDM incorporates a wider ethical skepticism 
ranging from how the CERs are traded against each other, i.e., the luxury emissions of 
the West versus the survival emissions of the South, to the fear of so-called low-
hanging fruits3 dominating the carbon-market, resulting in a new carbon colonialism 
(Blok 2010: 18-22). This brings forward a number of interesting questions related to 
the structure of the CDM, the political, institutional and ideological landscape 
surrounding the CDM and the expectations of the CDM. 
This paper takes as its point of departure the criticism of the CDM. The hypothesis 
laid forward here is founded on the argument that the CDM suffers from an embedded 
structural flaw which can be seen in the unbalance between what the CDM was 
expected to deliver and how the tool to deliver these expected benefits was ultimately 
structured. More simply, this paper argues that the CDM fails in delivering 
sustainable development because it was structured as a market mechanism, and a 
successful one at that, of which the role is to guarantee low-cost solutions and not 
sustainable development.  
This paper attempts to prove this hypothesis valid by analysing the structure of the 
CDM, its functions, and why it was structured as a market mechanism with a dual 
objective. In doing so, this paper questions if it is possible to fuse conventional and 
non-conventional thinking on development, and whether the institutional framework 
for the CDM can guarantee win-win benefits on behalf of all states involved. It 
questions whether it was somehow utopian to assume that the pitfalls of the 
modernisation paradigm and the capitalist system will be diminished or even 
abolished just by rhetorically altering the expected outcome – here referring 
specifically to the expected development side benefits. It questions to what extent the 
CDM represents an actual paradigm shift in the perceptions of how to achieve 
sustainable development, or whether the CDM essentially is some cosmetic alteration 
in order to maintain business as usual.  
For the purpose of understanding the issues related to the CDM’s functionality, a 
reflection on the conceptualisations of the terms development and sustainable 
development is included as discursive background knowledge to be used in later 
discussion and analysis. This section is followed by a deeper reflection and analysis of 
the CDM’s structure and functionality. The analysis can roughly be divided into two 
main sections: the first revolves around the CDM’s favouritism of certain areas and 
certain project types; and the second focuses primarily on political and discursive 
aspects related to the CDM. The paper concludes with a brief summary and reflection 
of key issues. 
Development Versus Sustainable Development: Where Does the CDM 
Fit? 
Development theory has, since its critique of the feudal society in the 18th century,4 
come to encompass and represent many different ideas and perspectives ranging from 
the invisible hand of Adam Smith, to the notion of development without growth in 
terms of redistribution. Each theory reflects the contexts out of which they arose and 
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the ‘political positions of their proponents, the places where they developed, their 
philosophical perspective, and whether they are predominantly economic, 
sociological, anthropological, historical, geographic, and so on’ (Peet and Hartwick 
2009: 21; Larrain 1989: 1). 
Though each theory of development is characterised by its own specific 
characteristics and addresses specific contexts over time, many agree that 
development theories do share similar ideas and assumptions, and can therefore be 
roughly divided into two opposing groups: conventional theories of development and 
non-conventional theories of development (Peet and Hartwick 2009: 21). There are 
those who implicitly identify development with economic growth (Sachs 2010: x) and 
essentially accept the existing capitalist system as the best system for society because 
it is natural, inevitable, and to some extent unchangeable. The accumulation of 
wealth, even if it is only by a few, is seen as ‘spurring the entrepreneurship and 
innovation they see motivating the development effort’ (Peet and Hartwick 2009: 21). 
From this perspective, inequality becomes the inevitable price of progress and poverty 
the unfortunate, but eventually rectifiable, consequence of growth (Peet and Hartwick 
2009: 21). On the other side, there are those who identify development with more 
rights and resources for the poor and powerless (Sachs 2010: x). These non-
conventionals or critics see the existing capitalist system as “fundamentally flawed, 
‘ethically challenged’, morally wrong, and dangerous to people and the planet” (Peet 
and Hartwick 2009: 141). What these theories seem to have in common is an 
emphasis on “well-conceived development rather than more growth” and some even 
speculate that global development may be achieved without growth by redistributing 
production, income and consumption from places in surplus to those who have too 
little (Peet and Hartwick 2009: 141). 
The term development—what it means and how to achieve it—has also become a 
much contested issue. The concept of development has been accused of being a tool 
of marginalisation and disempowerment (Beer and Swanepoel 2001: xv) to being 
defined as ‘making a better life for everyone’ and ‘changing the world for the better’ 
(Peet and Hartwick 2009: 1-2). Some argue that development in the latter perspective 
becomes a powerful emotive tool because it appeals to the best in people and it 
becomes optimistic and something to strive for (Peet and Hartwick 2009: 1). Others 
believe development to be a concept of “monumental emptiness, carrying a vaguely 
positive connotation”, which has been used to disguise a Westernisation of the World 
(Sachs 2010: vii; Mehmet 1999: 1). According to Wolfgang Sachs, the core of the 
problem is to be found in the semantic confusion brought about by the concept of 
development: “after all, development can mean just about anything” (Sachs 2010: x). 
Development’s offspring is sustainable development, which seems to suffer from the 
same fate. Environmental and ecological issues began to influence ways of thinking in 
relation to development during the 1970s. Until then, modernisation theories had 
managed to maintain their foothold as the most predominant discourse on 
development, and had focussed attention on strategies that promoted more growth. As 
Sachs stated, “it is the legacy of the twentieth century that the desires of nations for a 
better tomorrow are predominantly directed towards development-as-growth” (Sachs 
2010: x). The publication of The Limits to Growth in 1972, however, raised questions 
about the assumption that growth could continue indefinitely and explored various 
global concerns which could lead the world to a crisis of catastrophic proportion (De 
Beer and Swanepoel 2001: 50). Such questioning eventually called for the 
international society to address environmental and ecological issues in relation to 
development. The Brundtland Report from 1987 popularised the notion and concept 
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of sustainable development on the political agenda (Kolhus et al. 2001: 9), and 
underlined that environmental issues and development were closely interconnected 
(De Beer and Swanepoel 2001: 50; Greene 2006: 457).5 
However, it also became a representation of what has been referred to as “a major 
rescue operation for the development idea” in which the main priority was to figure 
out how to “protect nature while keeping on competing and growing economically” 
(Sachs 1999: xi). This “implicit agenda of many efforts to reconceptualise 
development” (Sachs 1999: xi) was only scrutinised by those who essentially saw 
growth as the problem and not the solution to development issues (Sachs 1999: xi). 
Since the publication of the Brundtland Report, nations, governments and various 
corporations have made an effort in promoting sustainable operations, whilst the 
international community through the United Nations and non-governmental 
organisations are engaging in activities and projects designed to make sure 
development activities are sustainable (Campbell and Mollica 2009: xvii). But similar 
to the term development, sustainable development has come to encompass very broad 
and diverse applications to such an extent that it “has allowed many social actors to 
adopt a cosmetic approach to development projects that does not assure substantial 
changes in their treatment of environmental problems” (Trzyna 1995: 72; Sachs 2010: 
x). As a result, the term has suffered from a great deal of criticism over the past 
couple of decades, ranging from accusations of being “radically incomplete” – as it 
has no specific content and puts no limits on what sorts of things can be regarded as 
sustainable or for how long – to being a “vague and almost meaningless idea” 
(Campbell and Mollica 2009: xv).  
The ambiguity associated with concepts such as development and sustainable 
development is only further complicated by the existence of different values and 
perspectives on what is better for society and its people – an innate ambiguity that has 
clear implications for how any operations labelled sustainable are evaluated and 
assessed. This naturally also applies to any assessment of the CDM’s functionality.6 
When superficially glancing at the CDM, it seems very obvious that the CDM is 
rooted in modernisation theory and the assumption that free market forces can 
generate development in terms of economic growth. However, the CDM’s objective 
of addressing climate change and promoting sustainable development is, from the 
outset, far from the conventional ideas of promoting or reinforcing “the hegemony of 
the economic worldview” (Sachs 2010: x), which is interesting because it seems to 
indicate a contradiction between rhetoric and actual intentions. It is interesting 
because one cannot help but wonder if the CDM in fact was meant as an economic 
development tool, emphasising conventional Western values of economic growth, and 
that the concept of sustainable development was only added because contemporary 
discourse on development would never allow the notion of sustainability being left 
out of the equation. In other words, because the term sustainable development has 
come to mean just about everything, it has now become acceptable in contemporary 
discourse on development that economic growth is sustainable development. 
The CDM, Its Structure, and Why This Structure Was Chosen 
At the time of the launching of the CDM, the international society had long witnessed 
a conflict between the North’s focus on climate change as a global environmental 
problem and the South’s focus on climate change as a development problem (Olsen 
2005: 3). The negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
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Climate Change (UNFCCC) were indeed characterised by a North-South dichotomy 
in which the South had a development first agenda, which means that facing the 
challenge of meeting basic development needs are prioritised (Winkler et al. 2002: 
61), and the North had a climate first priority, rooted in the characterisation of climate 
change as a development problem in the South, but an environmental problem in the 
North (Wright 2007: 42). Reaching consensus was further complicated by the 
historically contingent greenhouse gas (GHG) emission and related development gap 
between the North and the South. The less developed South wanted the industrialised 
North to take prime responsibility for the global climate change and address 
development issues in the South before committing to GHG reduction. Climate 
change, it was argued, “had been caused mainly by the developed countries who had 
the corresponding responsibility to solve it within their own territories. If measures 
were needed in poorer countries the wealthier countries could pay for these too” 
(UNFCCC 2004: 13). The divergent views on how to structure the CDM and for what 
primary goal, ultimately resulted in the US rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and would 
have jeopardised the endeavour all together had it not been for the transformative EU 
(Grubb 2002: 139-141; De La Torre 2006: 6). Perhaps, this also explains the high 
expectations surrounding the Kyoto Protocol and, in extension, the CDM and why it 
has been hailed as being “a masterpiece of compromise” (Wilkins 2002: 1). 
The dual objective of the CDM and the architecture of the processes of approval can, 
in fairness, be regarded as a compromise between the industrialised North and the 
developing South, but also as an attempt to create a balance in the prioritisations of 
these different levels of interests.7 By incorporating priorities of the North and the 
South, the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and ultimately the CDM, become an 
institutional framework in which all parties are engaged because they have assessed 
such to be beneficial for all – the institution as well as the nation states. The cost-
benefit notion from neorealism (Keohane 1984: 73) is a good illustration for the 
considerations expressed during the negotiations and how the agreements ultimately 
panned out as the acknowledgement of the developing countries’ domestic issues 
became an important factor in establishing the CDM. The developing countries agreed 
to the CDM only as long as the primary goal of the mechanism was that of achieving 
sustainable development (Figueres 2006: 3). The institutional setting of the CDM and 
the interactions within it indeed illustrates that concerns related to national 
sovereignty, national self-determination, and national issues of providing for one’s 
own citizens are many times prioritised over international cooperation, unless the 
benefits outweigh any losses.8 This is to some extent underlined by the fact that host 
countries of CDM projects are responsible for determining and assessing what 
sustainable development constitutes based on their individual needs, as this illustrates 
that domestic concerns and potential loss of national sovereignty were very important 
and influential factors in the establishment of the CDM, despite the assumed functions 
of the institution.9 
The establishment of the CDM brought with it high expectations. The perceived 
outcomes the CDM was able to produce are founded on a number of underlying 
assumptions on how to address international issues such as climate change and 
development. It has been argued that the CDM implicitly perpetuates a “long-standing 
agenda of capitalist modernity for the global South” and that it to some extent revives 
the “developmental ethos of the recent past,” despite current trends away from grand, 
macro theories of development (Wright 2007: 23). As mentioned, the CDM is in 
many ways influenced by modernisation theory and neoclassical thinking on 
development when considering its structure as a market mechanism, the expectations 
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that market forces will generate development, and that developing countries want to 
develop. The North-South dichotomy seems to illustrate a scenario in which the North 
is the primary source for transferring knowledge and the tools for change, whilst the 
South is the target for change and development (Wright 2007: 23) – a scenario which 
also underlines the assumption that development is a shared objective by the North 
and South alike, and presupposes that the less developed countries want to catch up 
with the West. It is argued that modernisation theories also include the basic premise 
that “competitive behaviour and technological improvements coordinated through free 
markets lead to economic growth and, eventually, material benefits for everyone” 
(Wright 2007: 24) and looking at the CDM from a comparative angle illustrates that 
the CDM promotes similar approach to development, as it is assumed that the CDM 
market will generate economic benefits and ultimately generate development in the 
receiving host countries.10  
Taking the Kyoto Protocol—the overall framework for the CDM—into 
consideration and its “common but differentiated responsibilities” objective (The 
Kyoto Protocol: Article 10), one could argue that the CDM, in order to satisfy all 
needs of the parties involved, and secure the cooperation between these parties – and 
to some extent secure the institutional framework itself – has attempted to fuse 
conventional and non-conventional thinking in relation to development. It is 
conventional because it is a market mechanism expected to generate an economic 
flow and development side benefits for everyone, and because it is established within 
a Western institution. It is non-conventional because it recognises that development is 
multidimensional and that, to some extent, the North and the South have different 
responsibilities in relation to climate change, i.e., that the North should take 
responsibility for the underdevelopment of the South.  
However, as the CDM has been highly criticised for not providing sustainable 
development, one could question this attempt to fuse two divergent perspectives on 
development. Perhaps what we are witnessing is an example of Sachs’ suspicion “that 
the Western development model is fundamentally at odds with both the quest for 
justice among the world’s people and the aspiration to reconcile humanity and nature” 
that ecology and social fairness are “incompatible with the worldwide rule of 
economism” (Sachs 1999: x).  
Why the CDM is Failing in Delivering Sustainable Development 
Since the establishment of CDM, the international society has witnessed the growth of 
not only the carbon market in general, but the CDM market in particular and CDM 
projects rise all over the South. The number of CDM projects has risen from 100 
CDM projects moving through the formal process of approval in May 2005 (Cosbey 
et al. 2005) to a total of 4,753 CDM projects approved as of October 2012 (CDM 
2012). One could argue this illustrates just how rapidly the CDM carbon market has 
developed.  
However, the CDM encompasses a number of weaknesses in terms of ethical and 
political dilemmas and problems visualised by the dysfunctionality of the CDM, the 
discourse on the CDM, and the political deliberation on the CDM. The potential seen 
in the CDM and what it can deliver ultimately depends on how the entities involved 
chooses to interact and to what extent both objectives of the CDM’s overall goal are 
prioritised equally. Unfortunately, the CDM continuously finds itself in the midst of 
controversy and projects – such as the so-called HFC-23 CDM projects in China and 
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the Plantar project in Brazil – have to a great extent become the visual images of what 
critics of the CDM initially feared would happen.11  
The Dysfunctionality of the CDM 
There are several indicators of the CDM’s functionality that seem to suggest that the 
CDM focuses on certain aspects while neglecting others. Only four years after the 
establishment of the CDM, there was a tendency, both in the literature and in general, 
to focus extensively and almost exclusively on the issue of assisting industrialised 
countries in the North in achieving target compliance. This could be seen in the large 
number of estimates on GHG abatement potential combined with hardly any focus on 
how the CDM would contribute to sustainable development or to what degree 
(Kolshus et al. 2001: 1). This focus is in many ways underlined by the many projects 
that are attractive only in terms of GHG abatement. According to core observers, 
CDM activities indicate that most projects are single, isolated attempts to access GHG 
emission reduction and “that most industrialised country governments and 
corporations are using the CDM merely to reduce the costs of complying with their 
Kyoto targets and as such are searching for projects that deliver large volumes of 
cheap credits” (Pearson 2007: 247; Figueres 2006: 1). The reason, it is argued, is to be 
found in the structure of the CDM because as a market mechanism it will 
automatically search for least-cost carbon credits, and thereby sideline projects like 
renewables by not rewarding the multiple benefits they provide (Pearson 2007: 247). 
These arguments rely on framing the CDM’s ability to promote sustainable 
development in terms of whether the CDM is promoting renewables in developing 
countries and thereby assisting them in a transition away from fossil fuels (Pearson 
2007: 247). This also means that the arguments are dependent on data that indicates or 
illustrates that certain projects are more favoured than others because they deliver 
large volumes of cheap credits. With regard to certain project types, it is widely 
recognised that certain projects such as large so-called F-gas projects, and other end-
of-pipe options for capturing and decomposing non-CO2 GHGs like N2O and CH4 – 
which have high global warming potentials – do not produce any direct development 
benefits and are merely attractive from a low-cost emission reduction perspective 
(Olsen 2005: 13). These projects are, according to Pearson, the most common projects 
despite the fact that these projects “merely shift the location at which emissions 
reduction are made … without delivering additional sustainable development benefits 
to host countries and do not help catalyse fundamental shifts in energy production and 
use” (Figueres 2006: 1; OECD 2004: 31).  
Furthermore, when comparing generated credit volumes in order to judge what type 
of credits are the most popular in terms of being traded and sold, only 10% of the total 
credits issued were from renewables despite the fact that renewables accounted for the 
majority of all project types (Pearson 2007: 248).12 Today, it is estimated by the 
UNFCCC that 1,017,900,920 Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) have been issued 
(CDM 2012), but attaining detailed information about how many of these are 
generated from renewable projects seems to be a far more difficult task. The 
UNFCCC has no figures or statistics of such nature, and similar calculations have not 
been made since 200613 by the UNDP.14 The challenge in attaining such information 
brings forth another aspect of questioning, as one could wonder why such information 
is not made available by the UNFCCC itself. In many ways, it seems that the CDM on 
the surface promotes projects that emphasise renewables and thereby sustainable 
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development, but an in-depth investigation may indicate that the CDM market in fact 
is concentrated on CERs from projects where the contribution to sustainable 
development can be questioned. It is a difficult assessment to make, due to lack of 
reliable information. 
Another indicator can be seen in the CDM’s tendency to favour certain locations for 
implementation of CDM project activities (see Figure 1). The majority of CDM 
projects are located in countries where a certain level of development has already 
been reached and where this level of development can be argued to represent lower 
implementation costs related to the CDM. In December 2011, only 14 out of the 48 
countries classified as least developed by the UNFCCC15 had projects approved by the 
CDM Executive Board (EB), thereby representing only a total of 35 CDM projects 
located in least developed countries. In comparison, it is worth mentioning that China 
alone and its 2,417 CDM projects represent more than 50 per cent of all CDM 
projects (CDM 2012). Data such as these numbers seem to support the criticism from 
NGOs, such as the CDM Watch (2012), that the CDM is geographically biased. 
Comparing the credit volumes generated from these projects illustrate an even more 
skewed image (see Figure 2). China alone generates almost 60% of all CERs, thereby 
arguably also attaining far more foreign investment than any other participating 
country. 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
 
From a developmental aspect, it is interesting to note that those who have so far 
benefitted are countries that were already in transition and therefore not necessarily 
those countries which needed such investment the most. The fact that there are 
bilateral and multilateral development agencies working only to direct the CDM 
towards less developed countries, in particular the African continent (CDM Watch 
2012), also seems to suggest that the CDM requires additional initiatives to 
compensate for the embedded weaknesses of the CDM – in this case, the CDMs 
favouritism of specific geographic areas. Furthermore, the favouritism of certain 
geographic areas also brings forward the element of cost-efficiency right to the front, 
as many of the more developed countries chosen for CDM implementation represent 
locations in which costs are lower. As Cosbey et al. (2005: 46) have noted, “the 
beauty of any market mechanism is precisely that it will find the lowest-cost way to 
achieve its objectives.”  
The unbalance between the two goals of the CDM is, according to Olsen, widely 
documented, as the CDM involves trade-offs between the two goals in favour of 
producing low-cost emission reductions at the expense of achieving sustainable 
development benefits (Olsen 2005: 13). As Pearson has rightly observed, “while the 
CDM is rhetorically mandated to assist in achieving sustainable development and this 
should benefit renewables, no part of the CDM’s architecture specifically monetises 
those benefits and as such they play a limited role, if at all, in directing investment 
(Pearson 2007: 249).  
The Political Deliberation and Discourse on the CDM 
Some criticisms of the CDM are founded on a number of ambiguous terms and 
concepts associated with it. One of these is sustainable development, which has 
caused heated debates in terms of defining what it is, by whom, and how to assess the 
contribution to it. As introduced earlier, it is the host country of the CDM project in 
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question that is responsible for guaranteeing that a specific project with an applied 
CDM status is meeting the goals of sustainable development. The assessment of a 
CDM project is based on each country’s own sustainable development criteria which, 
one can assume, differs from country to country. There are two ways to assess this 
aspect. One could argue that the CDM acknowledges that the different countries in the 
South have different needs and that it therefore is impossible to create a common 
checklist for sustainable development criteria. An approach that also seems to indicate 
an acknowledgement of national sovereignty and self-determination in terms of not 
imposing one specific model or one set of values to address very different needs. 
However, even this pro-CDM view of this aspect poses a number of potential 
problems. One could argue that should an increase in competition requires it, host 
countries may be tempted to lower their sustainable development criteria or standards 
in an effort to attract foreign investment, thereby increasing chances of gaining 
benefits. In this scenario, the CDM—or, more specifically, the CERs generated from 
the CDM—becomes yet another commercial commodity in the free market as 
opposed to being a tool for the promotion of sustainable development. Such behaviour 
affects the integrity of the CDM’s overall objective, but it also affects the integrity of 
the institutional framework because there are no incentives to prevent such double-
crossing or cheating. The fact that various NGOs have suggested more restrictions in 
relation to the CDM projects to prevent such behaviour only underlines the risk for 
such behaviour (Foot 2004: 127). Furthermore, the lack of international agreement for 
a definition of sustainable development also means that there are no international 
agreed methods for evaluating or assessing to what extent the CDM project in 
question contributes to sustainable development. This means that any evaluation of 
the CDM is almost impossible (Olsen 2005: 11), but it also brings forth, again, the 
risk of host countries compromising their sustainable development criteria in their 
efforts to attract investors, as host countries may have little to bargain with due to the 
global scope of the CDM and investors’ wide choice of location (Olsen 2005: 11). 
This also illustrates that targets, purposes and goals, as described and expressed in the 
Kyoto Protocol, are very much dependent on domestic affairs rather than just foreign 
policies, and that the existence of the institutional setting for the CDM relies on how 
those involved in this collaboration assess the benefits.  
It has been suggested that the CDM should be reformed in order to better achieve its 
sustainable development component, and that defining what sustainable development 
means is a crucial aspect if sustainable development within the framework of the 
CDM is to be achieved (Cosbey et al. 2005: 44; McDonald 2010: 15). However, 
defining sustainable development across more than a hundred radically different 
countries is an extremely difficult—if not impossible—task. As indicated, issues 
regarding national sovereignty may have a huge impact on what can be done, and it 
seems unlikely that countries want to be dictated on some “universal” definition of 
what sustainable development is or should be. All countries claim to be in a better 
position to judge what sustainable development is in their particular national 
framework, and attempting to apply an internationally agreed upon set of criteria may 
cause countries to withdraw if the criteria in question are not regarded to be the best 
solution for that specific country (McDonald 2010: 15). This could be the reason why 
it is argued that no meaningful international agreement on the definition of sustainable 
development will be forthcoming (McDonald 2010: 15).  
Furthermore, due to the focus on cost-efficiency and the potential competition 
between the developing countries for investment and economic growth, it is no 
surprise that the focus is placed on the CERs generated as opposed to sustainable 
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development, as it is the CERs that are of value. This notion of CERs being nothing 
more than a new commodity for economic transaction and growth seems to be further 
underlined by questionable initiatives such as the HFC-23 CDM projects in China and 
the Plantar project in Brazil, which have gained much media attention due to the 
negative implications these CDM projects have (Blok 2010: 19). What these types of 
projects have in common is the generation of large volume CERs, and it seems rather 
clear that the focus of these projects is to generate CERs rather than taking into 
account what implications such a production of cheap CERs may have for 
sustainability or the environment. Keeping in mind the CDM’s ability to generate a 
successful carbon market, one could argue that this in itself is an indicator of the 
CERs being just another commodity in the free market, with developing countries 
risking their sustainable development criteria in the attempt of attracting investment 
due to the embedded competition in the market. In a period of less than six months 
(June 2011 - December 2011), approximately 650 projects went through the CDM 
project cycle of approval, despite the fact that the global market is only secured until 
2012. This rapid increase in establishing CDM projects could indicate that CERs as a 
commodity has gained much momentum in terms of being a trustworthy and valuable 
commodity. The fact that countries—such as India and China, which were initially 
extremely critical of letting a market mechanism dominate the CDM and the idea of 
commitment to reduce global climate change—have participated in such large 
numbers of CDM projects (Figure 1) and generated so many CERs (Figure 2) also 
implies that the CERs are viewed as a commodity that can provide economic benefits. 
The fact that there has been a tendency to focus primarily on the CDM’s ability to 
generate a successful carbon market indicates an acceptance within public discourse 
that this is what the CDM actually does. This also seems to validate the suspicion that 
the CDM is merely used as a positive marketing brand in line with current trends of 
corporations and companies wanting to portray a “green” profile, and that an actual 
paradigm shift is yet to be seen.  
Reflecting on the discourse on the CDM, it seems that there are two ways of 
assessing the CDM’s failure to deliver sustainable development. On the one hand, 
there seems to be a wide acceptance of the fact that the CDM does not deliver enough 
sustainable development because it was expected that it would deliver more. On the 
other hand, there is also a wide acceptance of the existence of the CDM and some 
consensus on the fact that even if the CDM has failed in some aspects, it is still a good 
incentive for the promotion of combating climate change and addressing sustainable 
development issues in the South as long as there is continued pressure for the 
improvement of the CDM. However, accepting that the CDM at the outset is a good 
idea—because it rhetorically addresses and acknowledges the importance of fusing 
collaboration on development and combating global climate change, as well as 
creating a framework for bridging the gap between the North and the South—does not 
necessarily mean we have to accept that the tool is good enough as it is. This means 
that if the tool is the reason for the lack of expected results, due to the embedded 
dysfunctionality, it can seem strange that the tool is not abolished altogether. 
Furthermore, considering the expiry date of these agreements and the problems 
related to committing to a new international agreement, one could question to what 
extent the CDM has managed to minimise the gap between the North and the South. 
In many ways, the lack of consensus among developed and developing countries in 
reaching new agreements seems to underline that the gap is as wide as it has ever 
been. What is interesting in this relation and to the evaluation of the CDM is whether 
one is to believe that economic profits can generate sustainable development or not, 
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and whether neoliberal institutionalism can provide the best framework for securing 
international cooperation of this magnitude.  
Reflection and Conclusion 
The CDM is a phenomenon loaded with complexities ranging from rhetorical 
weaknesses to a dysfunctionality embedded in the model, and to some extent, an 
unbalance within the institutional framework—i.e., balancing the prioritisations of 
national and international issues. These complexities are, in many ways, the result of 
trying to combine different perspectives from the North and the South, but also 
different perspectives on what sustainable development entails; what combating 
climate change entails; and what systems, structures, tools, ideas, and values are better 
for addressing issues of global nature and importance. It is, at times, difficult enough 
to reach agreement domestically within a country, which means that reaching 
consensus between governments, corporations, organisations, and institutions on a 
global level is a far more difficult task, especially keeping in mind national 
sovereignty and self-determination.  
One could argue that the CDM fails in delivering sustainable development because it 
is a market mechanism. The element of cost-efficiency was an important factor during 
the Kyoto negotiations, and it can therefore come as no surprise that cost-efficiency 
has become the guiding principle of the CDM despite its two mandated purposes of 
GHG emission reduction and achieving sustainable development. Furthermore, under 
the current structure of the CDM, the only element of monetary value is that of the 
credits. This means that they are the only incentive for investors to participate. 
Sustainable development in comparison is, at best, valuable in terms of having 
branding value. In many ways, it is utopian to assume that the CDM will deliver 
anything else than cost-efficient credits, which brings the very existence of the CDM 
into question. Perhaps it is better to acknowledge that the CDM in its current structure 
cannot do two things at once because there are no features of the CDM structure that 
support the notion of promoting sustainable development — that is, sustainable 
development in terms of being more than economic growth. 
Notes 
1. This is also known as the carbon market. For details on what constitutes the carbon market, see 
Lecocq and Ambrosi (2007: 139). 
2. The CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) supervises the Kyoto Protocol’s clean development 
mechanism under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP). The CDM EB is fully accountable to 
the COP/MOP. The CDM EB will be the ultimate point of contact for CDM Project 
Participants for the registration of projects and the issuance of CERs. 
3. Cheapest abatement options or cheapest emission reduction options that are favoured by the 
market and therefore easily sold, which may result in developing countries having to invest in 
more expensive measures in order to meet future reduction targets (Castro 2010: 2). 
4. For further reading on the historical background of the concept of development, see Larrain 
1989: 1. 
5. For exact wording and definition of “sustainable development,” see Our Common Future, 
Chapter 2, 1987. 
6. Neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol provides any exact definition of what is meant 
when using the term sustainable development. The protocol does instead provide what is best 
described as guiding principles for Annex 1 countries when promoting sustainable development 
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(see UNFCCC 1992, Article 1 for list of definitions and Kyoto Protocol 1997: Article 2 for list 
of guiding principles). 
7. For details on processes of approval, see Curnow and Hodes 2009: 33-34.  
8. For realist inspired accounts on how states interact within institutional settings, see Stean et al. 
(2005: 65) and Brown (1997: 49). 
9. For an elaboration on neoliberal institutionalism and functions of institutions, see Steven L. 
Lamy (2006: 207-221). 
10. This is supported by those who argue that the idea that the CDM can promote sustainable 
development is founded on the assumption that payments for environmental services, including 
carbon- and greenhouse gas emission reduction, can generate poverty reduction and enhance 
sustainable development (Minang et al. 2007: 615). 
11. For details and criticism on these projects, see Blok 2010. 
12. This is a rough estimate. See Pearson (2007: 248). 
13. This is as far as we have been able to assess from our research. 
14. See UNDP 2006 for their assessment of the CDM.  
15. The CDM in numbers: for figures and statistics on CDM, see http://cdm.unfccc.int; and for 
Least Developed Country information under the UNFCCC, see 
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/items/3097.php. 
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